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1 Introduction
Like most other aggregate functions in the macroeconomist’s
tool kit, the matching function is a black box; we have good in-
tuition about its existence and properties but only some tentative
ideas about its microfoundations. .... The most popular microe-
conomic models, such as the urn-ball game, do not perform as
well empirically.1
Job search is an intrinsically individual-level issue; it sums up the be-
haviour of two elementary units of an economy: firm and worker. What
we observe in the job market data is the consequence of such elementary
processes; unfortunately we have no a clear idea whether the aggregate level
is just the mirror, on a larger scale, of the microcosm or only a fuzzy and
distorted representation. Microdata shows that job market is characterized
by large gross flows of jobs creation and destruction (Davis, Haltiwanger
and Schuh 1996) as well as workers’ transition among unemployment, em-
ployment and out of the labor force status. At an aggregate analysis, the
Beveridge curve shows movements rather fuzzy, alternating relative stable
patterns to large changes in position and slope, as well as non-monotone
transitional paths (see Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, Bleakley and Fuhrer,
1997, Nickell et al. 2002). In other words, data shows that there is a remark-
ably level of ”churning” in the labour market; movements of the Beverdige
curve are the economy-wide response to a complex microeconomic frame-
work. The ”matching function” is the common thread between these two
worlds.
The process characterizing the single match between firm and worker
involves a high number of variables which are well reviewed in the Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2000, survey. Under this point of view, the idea of a ”simple”
description of the microcosm could be frustrated; nevertheless we can not
investigate into the labour market without to try to challenge this point.
This paper presents a first attempt at providing a simple but reasonably
descriptive analytical body for modelling job search at the individual level
which is coherent with a simple macroeconomic model. It relies heavily on
recent developments of mathematical and statistical research applied to the
investigation of the dynamics of epidemic processes.
The simplest way of looking at the job search mechanism is the one de-
scribed by the Pissarides Mortensen approach (PM hereafter): at every time
a firm randomly ”contacts” a worker, the match is closed and the unemployed
1Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2000.
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worker changes her status to employed (hence she is removed from the unem-
ployment population), the firm fills the vacancy and it can be removed from
the population of vacant firm. Meanwhile, new unemployed are born and
new vacancies are opened as the result of an exogenous separation between
an existing firm-worker unit. The matching rate, as well as the separation
one, can depend both on worker features, notably human capital, and firm
characteristics as well as on local spillovers.
However, before of describing the search and matching process, we have
to identify properly the ”actors” of this play. As pointed out by Blanchard
and Diamond, the common view of considering workers either as unemployed
or employed is too narrow: Much of the movement into ad out of employ-
ment is from ”out of the labor force”2 and again ”the relevant pool of workers
appears to include some workers classified as being out of the labor force3”.
”Persons not in the labor force who want a job now” is the standard U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of this share of workers and in general
is a form of hidden unemployment or labour reserve (see Castillo 1998 for
a detailed description). According to the US Current Population Survey, in
September 2003 the number of workers who were out of workforce not look-
ing for a job but that would like to work was about 4.6 million; it is worth
stressing that the larger share of hidden unemployment lies between age 16
and 54, i.e. in the most productive part of the working life. Average duration
of hidden unemployment is about 12 months in the CPS; nevertheless this
group of workers do not show a higher labour market attachment. Following
the Castillo analysis, only 41 percent of nonparticipants who said they wanted
a job in 1994 were in the labor force in 1995 as opposed to the strong labour
attachments shown by traditional unemployed job-seekers: 78 percent con-
tinued to be labor force participants in 19954. The hidden uemployment is
a sort of temporary retirement from the job market and this choice depends
on a lot of individual characteristics not least on the ”discouraged worker”
eﬀect; according to the US BLS: Discouraged workers are those persons who
say that they want a job, were available to work, had searched for a job some
time in the previous 12 months but had stopped looking for work because they
believed that there were no jobs available for them.
Once they decide to become job-seekers, persons out of the labor force
have more diﬃculty in finding a job. This introduce a diﬀerence in the dura-
tion of unemployment between these two groups, which broadly we can define
2Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, page 3.
3Idem, page 4.
4This implies that the flow from job seeker to out of labour force is low and negligible.
A point remarkable for our model.
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as long and short term unemployment5. In general the distinction between
attached and unattached workers is crucial for the analysis, as Blanchard and
Diamond show, and both theoretical and empirical models should account
for it.
Another relevant point concerns quits and layoﬀs with or without recall.
Workers who leave voluntary the job are usually considered as retired from
the labour force or not available for a ”new hire”, at least temporarily. Vol-
untary quits can also be driven by an employment-to-employment reason but
even in this case this flow does not create new hires; Akerlof Rose and Yellen,
1986, calculate that 40 percent of workers quitting their job move directly
to a new job without enter the unemployment status. More controversial
concerns layoﬀs: A worker who is laid oﬀ may remain attached to the firm in
two distinct senses. One is that the worker is less available for employment
elsewhere than the typical unemployed worker. The second is that the worker
is available for recall by the firm without the need to post a vacancy6. More-
over, Blanchard and Diamond assume that even the attached fired worker
becomes unattached over time if not recalled or hired in another job. These
points induce econometricians to exclude job losers on layoﬀ from the stock
of unemployment used to estimate the matching function but including per-
sons out of the labor force but that would accept a job if oﬀered, for the
reason previously recalled.
Our paper tries to set-up a theoretical model of job search and matching
on individual level providing also dynamical equations for the economy as
a whole. The questions recalled so far induce to think that the standard
dichotomy between employed and unemployed of the standard MP approach
is too stringent and it should be relaxed. On the other hand the introduction
of either element makes quite hard the development of an analytical body.
By the point previously discussed it is possible to infer two questions: the
importance of the introduction of ”persons not in the labor force who would
a job” in the total labour supply and the explanative hierarchy between job-
losers and job seeker for the matching process. This twofold remark coming
from current literature induce us to consider labour force as being composed
by unemployed job-seekers, U , employed, E, and out of the labour force or
unattached, R. It is worth stressing that this status can proxy for the long-
run unemployment, as stressed by Blanchard and Diamond. Nevertheless
we have also to identify how workers change their status; this is particularly
important for the probabilistic model we will see in section 5. The previously
5Blanchard and Diamond find that long-term unemployment is a good proxy for the
pool of workers out of the labor force (page 32).
6Blanchard and Diamond, ibidem, page 18.
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cited Castillo analysis, points out the strong attachment of job seeker to
labour force and so we can assume that the flow U → R is negligible and that
the relevant one is U → E. At the same time the flow E → U tends to be of
a less importance in analyzing ”new hires” because quits or employment-
to-employment changes do not involve new vacancy posted and, further,
because lay oﬀs , as previously recalled, involve either strong attachment
to the firm, for example because of firm or industry specific human capital,
and in this case we are close to the employment-to-employment flow, or a low
attachment. We follow the Blanchard and Diamond suggests of considering
low attachment as a form of long term unemployment as opposed to the short
term one characterizing workers in the U state. In order to simplify the model
we are going to use the R state both for hidden and long run unemployment.
In this way we can model attached workers, U, and non attached, R, or
alternatively unemployed job seeker and long run unemployed. For such
reason we assume E → R and obviously R→ U since non attached workers
become employed by passing through the job seeker status. In other words, a
cyclical hierarchy of status will be considered, namely U → E → R→ U.We
are ruling out intermediate steps as U → R, E → U as of minor importance
for the job search and matching process, as the cited literature points out.
This strict hierarchy of states allows us to exploit a dynamic Monte Carlo
technique to build a probabilistic model describing individual behaviour over
time; moreover search intensity, driving the transition rates U → E and
V → F - where V stands for the firm vacancy and F for filled - of both firm
and worker, is made endogenous by a rational behaviour. From the micro-
model we also obtain the diﬀerential equations describing average transitional
path to the long run equilibrium - i.e. to the Beverdige curve - providing
the dynamical analysis over the economy as a whole, an investigation close
in spirit to the model developed in Blanchard and Diamond.
Our goal is hence to provide an alternative approach to the job search
issue based on a probabilistic law that allows us to analyze coherently both
the single unit history, i.e. the micro-dynamics, and on the economy as a
whole, undertaking in this case analysis based on aggregate data.
In the last part of the paper we focus on how transition rates are aﬀected
by local spillovers or social networks. A part of job matches come from al-
ternative channel than the usual posted vacancy; as recalled in Cahuc and
Fontaine, 2002, ” a large proportion of people (about 50% on average) hear
about or get their job through friends and relatives”. We will investigate on
transitional path and steady state when the worker transition rate U → E
depends in part on the her own search intensity and in part on her social net-
work. In particular we are going to assume that the transition rate increases
according to the number of employed person in a surrounding of the individ-
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ual. This a typical spillover eﬀect, close in spirit to the literature focussing
on local interactions in the accumulation of human capital. It is worth stress-
ing however, that, unlike current literature, our probabilistic model allows
us to make endogenous the network structure, in sense that the number of
employed workers changes over time according to the matching process of the
economy. This has remarkable eﬀects on results; social network can or not
increase matching eﬃciency according to the weights put on the local compo-
nent of the transition rates, parameters and initial conditions. A reduction
in eﬃciency is possible when the matching process relies heavy on the local
component and the social network tends to be emptied over time, i.e. the
number of employed individuals reduce as a consequence of an increase in
unemployment. This result induce more caution in stressing the importance
of local eﬀects on improving job matching than the one now recognized.
The paper is organized in four logical steps: the first one is devoted to the
individual analysis where ”optimal” transition rates are obtained according to
a rational behaviour of firm and worker. The second one shows how obtaining
macro equations by averaging over these individual rates. Subsequently the
probabilistic model shows how we can obtain the micro-dynamics coherently
with the macro one. In the last section of the paper, we show how the
probabilistic micro-model allows to take into consideration ”local” or ”social
network” components in the job search mechanism.
2 Single-Worker Analysis
We start by considering the individual working life. As pointed out in the
previous section, we are going to divide the total labour supply in job seeker
or attached workers, U, employed, E, and unattached or long run unemployed
temporary not looking for a job but that would a job if oﬀered, R.
Obviously L = U +E+R. Total labour supply L provides the metric for the
flows hence 1 = u+ e+ r where x = X/L. K is the total number of firms in
the economy; when L = K full employment is possible, since we are going to
assume, as in the MP spirit, one worker one firm. In such a case F + V = L
or f + v = 1 where obviously f = e.
A worker randomly drawn from the population occupies one of these
three status; nevertheless the status will be ordered hierarchically since a
worker is employed only after she was a job seeker, i.e. U −→ E. For reasons
previously recalled, we assume that once the worker separates from the firm
she does not became immediately a job seeker but stays in the state R before
of entering again the state U ; the average time of occupancy of the status
R depends obviously on the transition rate from state R to U . As will be
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clearer later, this assumption of stages hierarchically ordered allows us to
characterize the steady state of the job market as a balancing of flows out
and in the U, E and R states; in this way the model fits the oﬃcial partition
of the work force in unemployed, employed and labour reserve.
Under a probabilistic point of view, the simplest way at modelling the sin-
gle worker lifetime is a ”three states process”. Worker lifetime is a continuos
jump in and out three possible states: U, E and R. Each agent is character-
ized by an own string of U, E and R recording her history over time; the
length of time the individual stays in a given state is a random variable and
the Poisson distribution is a good approximation of this occupancy time, as
well known.
This process can be easily described in a probabilistic way: if the worker
is unemployed but actively engaged in job search at time t, she can change
her status to employed at the instantaneous rate α, and the probability that
she will be eﬀectively employed in the time interval t +∆t, is simply α∆t7.
Likewise, when the worker is employed, she has a probability β∆t to be
separated during t+∆t;finally an unattached worker has a probability µ∆t
to be a job seeker during t+∆t. The coeﬃcients α, β and µ are the transition
rates; they can depend both on individual and firm characteristic, although
we are going to treat them as exogenous parameters along this section.
When the worker changes her status, she stays in the new state for a
random time τ ; as said, this waiting time is well modelled by a Poisson
process. Our worker is a job seeker for a given time TU1 after then she becomes
employed for another random time TE1 then changes again to unattached for
a time TR3 and finally come back to the status of job seeker and so on.
The dynamic of the probability to be in a given state at time t follows the
Kolmogorov forward equations (see Cox and Miller, page 172):
dPE(t)
dt
= −βPE(t) + αPU(t)
dPU(t)
dt
= −αPU(t) + µPR(t) (1)
dPR(t)
dt
= −µPR(t) + βPE(t)
with initial condition and PU(0) = 1 − PE(0)− PR(0) given. The above
equations have a prompt interpretation; they describe the evolution of the
7More precisely is α∆t+ o(∆t) where o(∆t) means a function which tend to zero more
rapidly than ∆t. Intuitively this means that in a small time interval (ideally when ∆t
tends to zero) the process can undertake only a single change of state (point process).
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probability over time according to a balancing of inflows and outflow. As an
example, let us focus on the first one; the probability of finding a worker in
the employed status increases with the inflows from unemployed to employed
(αPU(t)) and decreases with the separation βPE(t).
The steady state solution is :
PE =
µα
βα+ βµ+ αµ
PU =
βµ
βα+ βµ+ αµ
(2)
PR =
βα
βα+ βµ+ αµ
The steady state is a stable node and so the long run distribution does not
depend on initial conditions; this means that if we observe a single worker
job history over a suﬃcient long horizon, then the percentage of time spent
in a given state, E , U, or R is close to the theoretical distribution. The
strong convergence and the independence of initial conditions are valuable
properties for empirical analysis.
From here we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Over a suﬃciently long time, the proportion of time spent in any
state i ∈ {U,E,R} converges in probability to P i, where P i is given by eqs.
2.
Proof. See Cox and Miller, 1972, pages 172-175.
This lemma is particular useful to our scope; it says that if the worker
lifetime is suﬃciently long, as we are going to assume, then the individual
knows the expected time of being employed, job seeker or out of work force.
This property will be exploited to analyze individual behaviour.
If the worker lifetime would consist of two states only, U and E, then
PE = αα+β and P
U = βα+β ; Blanchard and Diamond, page 7, call P
E as c,
for cycle, in sense that it measures the degree of aggregate activity in steady
state and s = βc, where s stands for shift, as an index of the intensity of
reallocation in the economy.
3 Individual Choice
In the previous section we have modelled the transition probability for in-
dividuals as driven by exogenous parameters α, β.and µ. However human
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capital literature stresses the role of the investment in education in aﬀecting
these transition rates. In particular we focus on α, leaving β and µ exoge-
nous. The transition probability from job seeker to employed is positively
aﬀected by the educational level: higher education induces higher transition
rates. However the investment in education is performed before the entry in
the job market (we leave aside on the job human capital accumulation) and
so the simplest way at modelling the individual worker lifetime is to divide it
in two periods, chronologically ordered. During the first one, the individual
perform her choice about education. The educational choice is conditional
on the expected return of joining the market; moreover human capital is
irreversible and indivisible hence the choice can not be renegotiated further
over time. It is worth stressing that the individual choice is not conditioned
on the status of being unemployed, as happens in MP, but on the expected
return of joining the job market.
As previously stressed, once joined the labour market, the individual
lifetime is a continuos change over the three admissible status; Lemma 1 says
that the total expected time spent in each state is given by the 2. Before
joining the job market the individual has to invest in education; in order
to simplify the model, we are going to assume that education is oﬀered to
individuals as a continuum of ”school-packages” indexed by the amount of
human capital α embodied in each package; α is also the cost of each package
in eﬀort term. In this way the worker must buy a given package before joining
the labour market and spending the acquired human capital. The length
of this first period is instantaneous; once bought the optimal package the
individual enters the job market immediately. When employed the worker
earns w per unit of time, while as job-seeker she incurs in a instantaneous
search-cost C(α) proportional to the acquired human capital; the higher α,
the higher the transition probability from U to E but heavier is the suﬀered
loss. Finally we assume that when the worker is out of the work-force she
earns neither w nor pays for the search cost C(α); in particular we simplify
assuming zero value for this state.
By these assumptions, the optimal package α is chosen in order to maxi-
mize the discounted expected income stream over the working life:
Max
αe
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
£
(PEw − PUC(αe)
¤γ
dt =Max
αe
£
(PEw − PUC(αe)
¤γ
ρ
where probabilities are given in the 2 and γ < 1. By assuming C(α) = α2,
simple static maximization leads to:
9
α∗e =
q
µ
¡
β2µ+ w(β + µ
¢
− βµ
β + µ
(3)
Optimal educational eﬀort is increasing in w. The supply curve in the
economy is upward sloping: the average number of matches is α∗²U and is
increasing in w.
As far as firms is concerned, they have to choose the optimal search
intensity αf , i.e. the transition probability per unit of time of jumping from
vacant to filled. In this case the MP approach applies: the arbitrage equations
for, respectively, the filled V F and vacant V V status are:
rV F = y − w + β(V V − V F ) + V˙ F
rV V = −c(αf)− αf(V V − V F ) + V˙ V
Perfect competition requires V˙ V = V V = 0 hence V F = c(α
f )
αf . By assuming a
quadratic search cost we have that the firm value when filled coincides with
the search intensity V F = αf . As in Pissarides (pages 28 and 29) the only
rational expectation equilibrium requires V˙ F = 0 and this brings immediately
to:
αf =
y − w
r + β
(4)
the higher the wage the lower the search intensity. In this case the demand
curve is downward sloping.
Wage determination comes from a market clearing condition instead of
a bargaining process, as in MP; instantaneous market equilibrium requires
that same number of matches comes form both sides of the market, i.e.
α∗V = α∗eU or α
∗v = α∗eu at the same wage w. By solving 3 and 4 jointly
with the market clearing condition α∗v = α∗eu, we obtain:
α∗e =
p
φ1u2 + φ2uv + φ3v2 − µ (2βv + u(r + β))
2v(µ+ β)
(5a)
where φ1 = µ
2(r2 + 2r + β2), φ2 = 4µ
2β(r + β), φ3 = 4µ(β
2µ+ µ+ β). It is
straightforward to see that α∗e is always positive.
Given the individual transition probability as in the 5a, the average in-
stantaneous matching function for the entire economy is m = α∗eu, i.e.:
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m ≡ α∗eu ≡ α∗v =
p
φ1u2 + φ2uv + φ3v2 − µ (2βv + u(r + β))
2(µ+ β)
u
v
= m(u, v)
(6)
Although a bit cumbersome, the matching function is increasing, concave
and linearly homogenous of degree one in u and v, as in the spirit of the MP
approach.
4 Macro-Dynamic Analysis
The model is essentially dynamic in its nature and in this section we are go-
ing to obtain the diﬀerential equations characterizing the average dynamics;
given an initial condition, the job market evolves towards the steady state
represented by a point on the Beverdige Curve.
Given the instantaneous transition rates 5a we derive the diﬀerential equa-
tions for the economy by averaging over firms and workers. For a job seeker,
the average probability, per unit of time, of changing status from unem-
ployed to hired (U → E) is α∗e times the probability of finding an individual
in the unemployment status, PU , i.e. α∗ePU , where PU = U/L. In the time
interval ∆t, corresponding to L elementary steps8, the average number of
unemployed being employed is α∗ePUL∆t; hence, the number of unemployed
decreases at the rate ∆U/∆t = − α∗ePUL = −α∗euL. The number of unem-
ployed instead increases by µR. Likewise the number of vacancy decreases at
the rate ∆V/∆t = − α∗PVL = −α∗e uvPVL = −− α∗euL. Clearly the average
matching function m must be the same both for unemployed and vacant firm
since that, once a match is closed, both variables decrease by one unit as we
assume, as in MP, one worker - one firm. Conversely the number of vacancies
increases, in the unit of time, when a separation occurs, i.e. β(1 − u − r).
Finally the number of unattached workers increases by β(1 − u − r) and
decreases by µR.
Summing up, we obtain the following dynamical equations:
8For computational purposes we normalize the number of elementary units to the size
of the economy.
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du
dt
= −m(u, v) + µr
dv
dt
= −m(u, v) + β(1− u− r) (7)
dr
dt
=
dv
dt
− du
dt
= β(1− u− r)− µr
u(t) + e(t) + r(t) = 1 (8)
e(t) + v(t) = k (9)
By imposing the steady state condition dv
dt
= 0 in the second equation
and substituting from the third we obtain the long run relationship between
vacancy and unemployment, i.e. the Beveridge curve.
The model has three equations in two unknowns, since r(t) is obtained by
the previous two, leaving the dynamics essentially driven by u(t) and v(t);
the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of eqs. 7 is zero and there are two
complex roots with a negative real part while the third is zero. In such a
situation, all solutions converge to a three-dimensional manifold with the
consequence that the steady state, as well as the transition path, depends
on initial conditions (see for example Kamien and Schwartz page 347). The
Beveridge curve is the projection of such a manifold in the bidimensional
plane u, v. This makes impossible to analyze dynamics by the standard
phase-diagram technique and numerical solutions must be carried out.
In order to calibrate parameters, we are going to use data by the US
Labour Bureau, and in particular by the recent monthly Job Openings and
Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS)9; unfortunately the survey does not cover
period before December 2000. Data on unemployment comes from the na-
tional unemployment rate seasonally adjusted. Figure 1 plots the monthly
series trough January 2001 and November 2003 jointly with and estimated
tendency line.
9See Monthly Labor Review, December 2001, for details.
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Figure 1: U.S. Beveridge Curve
Although the figure is quite fuzzy, during 2001 the inverse relationship
between v and u is rather stable. From January 2002 to November 2003 the
curve undertake some rapid fluctuactions around the tendency line.
We calibrate parameters on the estimated beveridge curve of Figure 1
where the unemployment rate spans between 4.2 and 6.3 percent while the
vacancy rate between 3.2 and 2.0 percent. Figure 2 shows the calibrated
Beveridge Curve and some transitional paths.
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Figure 2: Calibrated Analysis
Transitional paths can be either clockwise or anti-clockwise depending on
initial conditions; in general starting from a vacancy rate below 1.9% and
unemployment higher than 5.4% involves anti-clockwise dynamics. Vacancy
higher than 1.9% involve clockwise dynamics whatever the initial unemploy-
ment rate. There is an intermediate parameters region, broadly v ≤ 1.9%
and u ≤ 0.54 where the transition path follows a ”S” path.
This sort of ”path-dependency” of the system is interesting in the com-
parison of the working of the job market and equilibrium unemployment
across countries: long run diﬀerences are induced not only by a diﬀerent
institutional setting or search mechanism but by diﬀerent initial conditions
as well. It is worth stressing that a similar idea can be found in Blanchard
and Diamond, although they do not formalize it; in particular they stress
that in a real job market movements into and out of unemployment are more
complex than the standard job search model, since these flow not necessar-
ily involve posted vacancies (this is the case of strongly attached workers).
In this case: ”what happens to vacancies and unemployment after a shock
will depend on the initial stocks of attached and unattached workers, which
themselves will depend on the history of the shocks.....Whether aggregate ac-
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tivity shocks generate counterclockwise movements in the Beveridge space is
much more ambiguous10.” Although these authors points out the shock re-
sponse of the Beverdige curve with the consequent transitional paths, they
observe that the distinction between attached and unattached workers make
the dynamics dependent on past history. The same holds for our model; the
type of transitional path is strongly aﬀected by the initial condition on the
r status, i.e. the one modelling unattached worker as opposed to the strong
attachment shown empirically by job-seekers.
Figure 3: Spurious Cycle
Although the dynamical model does not allow to obtain endogenous cycles
around the Beverdige Curve, it is possible identify proper initial conditions
and parameters producing dynamical paths that behave much like as cycle.
Figure 3 shows this type of spurious cycle; the dependence on initial condi-
tions makes hence rather hard to distinguish, in real data, a genuine cycle
from a shift in parameters.
This richness in transitional dynamics holds also in response to a pa-
rameter shock; Figure 4 shows a simulation where β increases by 20%. As
10Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, pages 19-20.
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expected the Beverdige Curve shifts to right reducing matching eﬃciency;
the adjustment is counterclockwise but other paths are possible according to
the initial conditions, as previously stressed. This type of exercise is close
in spirit to Blanchard and Diamond figure 2; an increase in β in our model
corresponds to a shock on the shift s parameter measuring the intensity of
reallocation. However, unlike these authors, our model provides more rich
dynamics and, as said, counterclockwise adjustment is possible but it is not
the only case.
Figure 4: Shock Response
More complex transitional paths can be obtained adding to the match-
ing function a temporal trend and/or some trigonometric function capturing
waves and cycles11; nevertheless this is out of our scope and we do not go
further on this.
11We do not show such simulations for brevity.
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5 Micro-Dynamic Analysis
In the previous section we have obtained the dynamical equations describing
the behaviour of the averages (macro-variables) over time. In this section we
show the microeconomic behaviour driving the micro one. In other words,
we are going to set-up a microeconomic world whose averages behave exactly
as the equations obtained in the previous section; if both ways of obtaining
the average dynamics produce same results then we conclude that the macro
and micro-analysis are coherent to each other; in this case we can indiﬀer-
ently investigate both the macro-world and the life history of a single agent,
depending on our research goal.
Probabilistic approach at modelling our problem involves, theoretically,
the analysis of the Kolmogorov equations for the entire economy, as we did
for a single agent. Unfortunately the dependence of the transition rates on
u and v makes very hard or impossible managing it. This type of problems
are common to other disciplines making use of a probabilistic approach to
systems characterized by a large number of states. Recently epidemiologists
working on the spreading of diseases across individuals have exploited a dy-
namic Monte Carlo algorithm which can be fruitfully applied both to the
numerical solutions of the probabilistic models used to forecast the evolution
over time of diseases and to the estimation of individual transition rates; a
good description of these methods is in Gilks et al., 1996. In particular we
are going to follow the Monte Carlo algorithm presented by Aiello et al.,
2000 and 2001. For a technical and detailed description of the algorithm and
its probabilistic features the reader should refer to the original papers; here
we present the main steps of the methodology applied to our problem of job
search.
We sum up the model basic assumption:
1. Workers amount to L and firm to K and the technology is 1:1, so
full employment is theoretically possible when L = K. At the begin-
ning, workers are divided in three sub-populations: employed E0, un-
employed looking for a job U0 and long run unemployed or unattached
workers, R0. Firms are divided in vacant V0 and filled F0. If L = K
then U0 +E0 +R0 = L = V0 + F0 and F0 = E0.
2. Workers and entrepreneurs are completely separated and there is not
flow from one to other; we can assume that this partition of the pop-
ulation is based on diﬀerent abilities, managerial skills, business risk
aversion and so on. The population is stationary.
3. When an unemployed worker meets successfully a vacant firm they
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become a productive unit labelled by the statusM . Matched units can
separate at the exogenous rate β. After separation, the worker enter
the state R - she comes out from this state as a new seeker at the
exogenous rate µ.− and the firm becomes V . By doing so, workers
have three possible stages hierarchically ordered, i.e. U → M → R
whilst the firm has only two V → M.
4. As in MP, firms and workers do accept the match, no matter who is the
proponent; we are interested in counting the number of matches and
separations over time, and updating the set {U,M,R, V } consequently,
and it does not matter who is ”driving” the match. There is a strict
duality between workers and firms spaces.
5. Transition rates from U to M and from V to M are given by eqs 3
and 4. From M to R and M to V by the exogenous separation rate β.
Finally the exogenous parameter µ is the transition rate from R to U.
The DMC algorithm allows us to investigate this structure over time.
As stressed at point 4, it does not matter who is leading the matching
process; what is important is that when a match occurs in the economy,
the sub-populations are adequately updated. Since we are interested in
analyzing the search mechanism on the side of the individual worker, we
are going to focus on this population. Workers are distributed into three
sub-populations initially randomly allocated in a one-dimensional vector;
workers are hence represented as a random collection of indexed individuals
U,U,M,R,M,U... on a one dimensional space. The dual vector representing
firms is V,M,M, V, V,M.... .
1. At each elementary time step l one individual is randomly drawn
from the population; let us suppose an unemployed worker. This agent
could change her status from unemployed to matched according to α∗e
but from a probabilistic point of view there can be other agents in the
economy whose probability of changing the status is higher than the
one characterizing our individual. So in deciding whether eﬀectively the
drawn individual will undertake a change, we have to compare her tran-
sition rate with the higher one in the population, i.e. pU = α∗e/WMax
where WMax = supP, .P = {α∗e,β, µ} The method suggested in Aiello
et al., 2000, is to compare pU against a random number r in the closed
unitary interval taken from a uniform distribution; the uniform as-
sumption models a situation where every agent has the same a-priori
probability of a jump; this means that when pU < r the real situa-
tion is less informative than the one characterized by a total ignorance
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about individual transition rates. Hence, if pU > r the drawn individ-
ual changes her status otherwise she stays in the original one. When
the individual changes the status the sub-populations U, V,M,R are
consequently updated.
2. The waiting time between two consecutive jumps follows a Poisson
process at rate r = α∗eU + βM + µR.
3. After the delay time, a new draw is performed and the simulation
restarts.
The result of this Markov Chain12 is the convergence of the sub-populations
to a long run probability measure whose first moment is given by the deter-
ministic equations 7. In the following section we show some simulations.
6 Results
We have performed 20 replications of the Monte Carlo method described in
the previous section; we have chosen 20 runs because it is enough to obtain a
smooth curve to be compared to the deterministic solution. Figure 5 shows
the adjustment path obtained by the average equations and the average of
20 simulations obtained by the micro-model13. As the reader can see, the fit
is satisfactory14.
12The dual DMC is the one where we analyze firms instead of workers but the two chains
lead obviously to same results.
13We plots only one transitional path for brevity, being the numerical computation
highly consuming in time. For this reason we graph a transition path broadly following
US data in 2001.
14A closer and smoother curve can be obtained by averaging over a higher number of
simulations. Nevertheless this is very time-consuming.
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Figure 5: Stochastic vs Deterministic Solution
By doing so, we can describe the adjustment path to the Beveridge curve
indiﬀerently by the macro-equations and the microeconomic model; both an-
alytical approach provides same results. Under this point of view, the macro
model is well founded in the microstructure. The probabilistic law character-
izing the micro-behaviour is working properly: it does provide same dynamic
path of the deterministic rules driving the first moment of the distribution.
7 Local Eﬀects and Individual Behaviour
Once built a suitable analytical tool that allows us to obtain average dy-
namics from the micro-structure, it can be used in a very flexible way to
modify the individual behaviour. In this section we show how we can ac-
count for local interactions in the search mechanism. It is not hard to as-
sume that matching can depends on ”local” variables. Local interactions,
or social networks, are often invoked in the human capital literature for ex-
plaining ”club convergence” and inter-generational inequality persistence. In
the search model social network are analyzed in Calvo-Armengol and Zenou
2001, Cahuc and Fontaine, 2002 where the social network is used to spread
the job oﬀer into the network, reducing the individual searching cost.
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We are going to assume a rather simple local eﬀect; individual matching
rates depends both on aggregate variables and on the number of workers
in a neighboring of the unemployed individual. The higher the number of
working agent in a surrounding of the unemployed worker, the higher the
matching rate. We can think to a sort of positive spillover or complementarity
eﬀect. Let us define p as the probability that an unemployed worker becomes
working due to the presence of a worker in the neighbor and so (1 − p)n is
the probability, per unit of time, for a unemployed not to become working if
she has n working neighbors hence (1− (1− p)n) is the probability, per unit
of time, for a unemployed to be hired if she has n working neighbors. When
n is large the local term tends to 1 whilst when n = 0 the local term is zero
(no-spillover); an increase in n makes higher the transition rate from U to
M . The individual transitions rates modify in:
U →M :WU = Γα∗(u, v) + Λ(1− (1− p)n)
where Γ + Λ = 1 in order to balance and local eﬀects. Under this point of
view, homogeneity of degree one for the matching function involves only the
microfounded term since the local eﬀect is a pure externality. It is worth
stressing that, unlike Calvo-Armengol and Zenou 2001, Cahuc and Fontaine,
200215, in our approach n varies across workers and over time; this implies
that there is a distribution of matching rates at each time t. This charac-
teristic is allowed by the probabilistic algorithm developed in the previous
section and it represents a novelty in the job-search literature.
The eﬀect of the local spillover is summarized in figure 6; this shows the
adjustment path without local variables (the dashed line), the path arising
by assuming p = 0.5 (the lowest one) and the one resulting by assuming
p = 0.1 (the highest one). As far as Γ, this has been held constant on 0.2
in order to put more weight on the local term. The network consists of 12
individuals centered on the i− th worker; six on the left and the remaining
six on the right.
Left Rightz }| {
(i− th)− 6; (i− th)− 5; ........(i− th).
z }| {
........(i− th) + 5; (i− th) + 6| {z }
Social Network
In other words, we have tried to compare the benchmark solution with a
two opposite situations: in the first one, the local term is rather strong since
15These authors assume that each worker is re-matched at random with n workers each
time a job oﬀer arrives.
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the probability p = 0.5 is relatively high. This corresponds to an individual
for whom the social network is important for the search mechanism. On the
contrary, when p = 0.1 the network is weak and this induces a negative eﬀect
on matching eﬃciency, as the figure shows.
Whether the social networks increases or not the match eﬃciency depends
on parameters; when p is suﬃciently high the local network increase individ-
ual probability to be hired, employment increases hence n grows making the
local component more powerful. This virtuoso circle increases matching eﬃ-
ciency respect to the case without spillovers. But when p is not suﬃcient to
start the positive feedback, it works in a reverse way, reducing n. The final
result is that, for suitable parameters Γ and p, the social network reduces
matching eﬃciency both along the transitional path and the steady state
equilibrium.
Figure 6: Social Network Eﬀect
This result depends on the endogeneity of the social network. This is
made clearer by comparing the distribution of the network at the steady
state when p = 0.5 and p = 0.1; results are in figure 7. It is rather clear
that the distribution when p=0.5 is more concentrated in the right part, at
meaning the highest weight that the network has in this situation
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Figure 7: Network Distribution
Concluding, when we account for endogeneity of the social network com-
position, it is not so clear whether local eﬀects are undoubtedly positive for
the matching mechanism but in order to investigate such a possibility we
have to focus on the single worker lifetime with proper tools. This paper is
a first answer to the question.
8 Conclusions
This first attempt at modelling job search at individual level has interest-
ing potentialities that the macro-dynamics can not capture. The debate
on investment in human capital and the eﬀects on job search and quitting
probabilities can only be faced by analyzing the single worker; in particular,
neighborhood eﬀects can have important eﬀects on the dynamics of the job
market. The approach we are developing fits particularly well in coping with
these spillover eﬀects. Individual transition rates can depend on the social
and economic neighbor of the individual and in general there is heterogeneity
in such rates; this brings to multiple equilibria and to dynamical path which
are quite diﬀerent by the ones we can describe by the aggregate equations. In
a more mature stage of our work we will exploit such interesting opportunity.
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